Every brief.
The full run, most recent first.
- § 01 · DEEPSEEK
The Questions Chinese Law Would Have to Answer: A January 2025 Reading of DeepSeek, the Garante, and Why EU Paperwork Cannot Fix Data Localization
A DCC summary, not a translation, of a 科技利维坦 (Li Wenlong) post dated January 31, 2025, written days after Italy's data protection authority, the Garante, questioned and then blocked DeepSeek. The post reads DeepSeek's position as a replay of OpenAI's in 2023, sets out what a minimum EU privacy posture for a large model looked like at the time, and identifies the one difference that compliance work cannot close: user data stored in China. Its China-facing conclusion is that EU documents and mechanisms do not solve localization. Trust would need clarity, in Chinese law, on the three data laws (CSL, DSL, PIPL) read with the National Intelligence Law, on the legal status of the Cyberspace Administration of China and the legal nature of the documents it issues, on due process when public bodies access data held by private companies, and on the remedies available to foreigners under the Civil Code and the PIPL. DCC sets out those four questions for counsel who are asked them from the other direction. The post predates everything after January 2025 and DCC has not updated its facts.
- § 02 · AI-GOVERNANCE
AI Agents and the Limits of Consent — When 'Authorisation' Stops Being One Click
Li Wenlong (科技利维坦) takes the Doubao phone assistant — an AI that 'reads your screen' and acts across apps — and asks whether the consent/authorisation mechanism that traditional data law leans on can survive the agent era. His four challenges: the app-bounded 'private' environment dissolves as data and permissions move across apps (with Nissenbaum's Contextual Integrity as the only real conceptual anchor, and far from operational); agents that *act* (not just retrieve) push informed consent past the point of failure already reached by personalised ads; purpose limitation collapses because an agent chooses its own path, means and decisions from a low-information instruction, edging into automated decision-making; and ultra vires agency shifts liability from user to platform, with China's 'hallucination case' and the Air Canada case as the only thin precedents. For overseas counsel building or advising on agentic AI in China: a map of why 'authorisation' is becoming a problem of agency, system control, liability allocation and autonomy — not a checkbox — and why transparency is now a prerequisite, not a feature.
- § 03 · AI-GOVERNANCE
Reverse Interoperability: Li Wenlong's Frame for the Doubao On-Device Agent Fight
ByteDance's Doubao phone assistant — preinstalled at the device layer to operate other apps on a user's behalf — was met with pop-up blocks from WeChat and others citing security and risk-control. Li Wenlong (科技利维坦) argues the dispute is, at bottom, a question of how China's competition-law toolkit (反不正当竞争法 / 反垄断法) absorbs the idea of interoperability — and specifically what he calls 'reverse interoperability (反向互操作性)'. The classic interoperability problem is a platform refusing to open up, with antitrust used as a market remedy to force access. Doubao inverts it: interoperability is fully achieved at the device level, and the legal question becomes whether the law should restrict 'over-interoperation.' Li maps interoperability's journey from the Microsoft case through GDPR data portability and the DMA to the agent era, distinguishes the Doubao fight from the decade-old 3Q War, and predicts on-device-agent governance will look less like classic antitrust and more like the ex-ante, conditional-use compliance model emerging for AI training data. For overseas counsel: a structural read on the platform-access war that on-device AI agents are about to intensify.
- § 04 · AI-AGENTS
The Initiative on Basic Rules for Agent Authorization and Interoperability (智能体授权互操作基础规则倡议, V1.0): Ten Principles and Ten Questions, in Full
A full translation of the operative text. The Initiative on Basic Rules for Agent Authorization and Interoperability (智能体授权互操作基础规则倡议), version V1.0, was released on November 7, 2026 at Zhejiang University's Sixth Forum on Rule of Law and Reform. It was initiated by the Zhejiang University Institute of Digital Rule of Law with sixteen co-initiators, mostly university research centers and law firms, drafted by twenty-six named experts, and published on Li Wenlong's 科技利维坦 channel. It is voluntary and binds only those who join. Its ten principles are autonomous authorization, proportionate interoperability, transparent rules, open standards, reasonable non-discrimination, equal treatment, fair competition, functional reciprocity, multi-party co-governance and effective remedy. Its ten questions and answers take positions on the live disputes: a user's authorization does not by itself oblige a third-party service to allow access; a service's failure to declare a refusal is not legal consent; reduced ad exposure or entry-point competition alone does not justify a restriction; identical rule text does not prove non-discrimination; and the Initiative cannot itself require any company to open an interface. DCC reads it against MIIT's Notice 工信厅信管〔2026〕42号, published one day earlier.
- § 05 · AI-AGENTS
The Agent Authorization Standoff After SAEP: Li Wenlong on Why 155 Apps Refused the Doubao Phone Assistant, and the Case for Reasonable, Non-Discriminatory, Reciprocal Interoperability Rules
On October 14, 2026 the Doubao phone assistant announced that the 30-day public notice period for its Screen Automation Execution Protocol (SAEP) had ended, and published a list of 155 apps that had refused GUI automation: 66 from Tencent's ecosystem, 23 from Alibaba's, plus Meituan, Kuaishou, Xiaohongshu, banks and AI apps. Li Wenlong (李汶龙, 科技利维坦) asks whether they refused because the protocol is unsound or because of the politics of agent authorization. He walks through SAEP's design: policy declared in AndroidManifest.xml and through a ContentProvider, three scopes (App, Activity, Intent), seven restriction fields and four system decisions (ALLOW, BLOCK, CALL_USER, CLARIFY). He finds it a real access-control scheme whose weak point is that rule-making, interpretation and enforcement sit with one party. He then reads the refusals through the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Stag Hunt and asymmetric games, sorts refusals into three kinds (security and compliance, structural distrust, and security used as a pretext against competitors), argues that anti-monopoly-style mandatory access is unjustified at this stage, and proposes a floor of shared rules built on reasonableness, non-discrimination and functional reciprocity. The essay predates MIIT's Notice 工信厅信管〔2026〕42号, which has since made app developers' declared consent a condition of agent invocation.
- § 06 · CAC
What Is New in the CAC's Filing FAQs: Same Model at Different Parameter Sizes Is One Filing, and Algorithm Filing Counts Algorithms, Not Products
A full translation. On November 9, 2026, the day the Cyberspace Administration of China opened the Internet New Technology and New Application Information Service Filing System at beian.cac.gov.cn, 数据何规 pulled four points from the FAQ documents on the portal's home page that it believes are stated at national CAC level for the first time. For generative AI: an application or function that directly calls an already-filed large model through an API may be registered locally, which the author reads as 'large-model registration goes to the provincial cyberspace administration'; and large language models with the same training corpus, algorithm and security safeguards that differ only in parameter size may be regarded as the same model and need not be filed again. For algorithm filing: the algorithm is the basic unit, so one algorithm used in several products is filed once and linked to each product; and review follows the order of submission, so an application resubmitted after modification queues again.