---
title: "Does China's Phone Agent Now Need Two Consents? 数据何规 Reads MIIT's Agent Terminal Notice as a 'Dual Authorization' Rule"
author: "DCC Editorial"
published: 2026-11-12T08:50:00.000Z
url: https://datacompliancechina.com/posts/miit-agent-notice-dual-authorization-phone-agents/
description: "A full translation. MIIT's Notice on Strengthening the Network Access Management of Agent Terminal Equipment (工信厅信管〔2026〕42号), published November 6, 2026, provides that 'without a declared consent, an agent shall not forcibly invoke or call up the app'. 数据何规 reads this as a dual authorization (双重授权) rule: a phone agent that operates an app for a user needs the user's authorization and the app's consent. The author argues that the rule on distribution and invocation is not confined to pre-installed agents, but that its practical weight falls on system-level GUI agents such as the Doubao phone, not on 'remote control' agents that run tasks in the cloud or on a PC. The piece defends Doubao's 30-day opt-out protocol (SAEP) as a Robots-style boundary declaration, and recalls that the Weibo v. Maimai judgment, (2016)京73民终588号, made platform authorization a separate requirement, while SPC Guiding Case No. 263, (2019)沪73民终263号, held a user-authorized linked-account data transfer not to be unfair competition. The author sets Amazon v. Perplexity beside these as a 'whose tool is it' test, and predicts the rule will be adjusted if platform refusals keep a phone-agent ecosystem from forming."
tags: ["ai-agents", "dual-authorization", "agent-terminal", "miit", "doubao", "saep", "weibo-v-maimai", "guiding-case-263", "anti-unfair-competition", "gui-agent", "gong-xin-ting-xin-guan-2026-42"]
laws_cited: ["miit-agent-terminal-network-access-notice", "anti-unfair-competition-law", "spc-data-rights-guiding-cases-47th-batch"]
domains: ["ai-governance", "data-economy", "app-compliance"]
account: "data-he-gui"
original_title: "中国手机Agent进入“双重授权”时代？"
original_author: "数据何规"
original_publication: "数据何规 WeChat Official Account"
original_url: "https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/1RKgZAoy6n0e-Hfk9ot6UQ"
source_language: "zh"
---

> **Source: Data Compliance China** — https://datacompliancechina.com/posts/miit-agent-notice-dual-authorization-phone-agents/ · China data law, translated and annotated for overseas counsel. Cite as: Data Compliance China, "Does China's Phone Agent Now Need Two Consents? 数据何规 Reads MIIT's Agent Terminal Notice as a 'Dual Authorization' Rule", https://datacompliancechina.com/posts/miit-agent-notice-dual-authorization-phone-agents/
> *Editor's Note — DCC.*
>
> **What the author is reading.** Part I, item (4) of MIIT's Notice on
> Strengthening the Network Access Management of Agent Terminal Equipment
> (关于加强智能体终端设备进网管理的通知, **工信厅信管〔2026〕42号**),
> published November 6, 2026. DCC's full translation of the Notice is on the
> law page,
> [MIIT Agent Terminal Notice](/laws/miit-agent-terminal-network-access-notice/),
> and DCC's own map of its obligations is in
> [MIIT Puts AI-Agent Phones Under Network Access Management](/posts/miit-agent-terminal-notice-gong-xin-ting-xin-guan-2026-42/).
>
> **The term.** "Dual authorization" (双重授权) comes from Chinese
> unfair-competition case law on platform data: a third party that takes
> user data through a platform needs the user's authorization and the
> platform's. The author applies it to an AI agent operating someone else's
> app.
>
> **How to read it.** This is a first-person opinion piece, written on the
> day the Notice came out. The author is openly disappointed by the rule.
> The translation is complete and keeps the author's voice. Product facts
> and the account of the US litigation are the author's; DCC has not
> verified them independently.

On November 6, 2026, MIIT published the
[*Notice on Strengthening the Network Access Management of Agent Terminal Equipment*](/laws/miit-agent-terminal-network-access-notice/)
(the "Notice"), which states: "Without a declared consent, an agent shall
not forcibly invoke or call up the app."

This means that before a phone agent operates an app on a user's behalf, it
needs the app's consent as well as the user's authorization.

With that, China's phone agents have formally entered the era of dual
authorization (双重授权). I find myself a little let down.

## I. Who is affected most?

The "agent terminal" in the Notice is a telecommunications terminal, such as
a phone, tablet or wearable device, on which an agent is pre-installed.

Products like the Doubao phone fall squarely within this. They therefore
face the requirements on agent adaptation verification, network access
testing, reporting of major changes and OTA upgrade management.

But the rules on the distribution of agent apps and on invocation are not
limited to the "pre-installed" scenario.

> (4) Improve the distribution management mechanism for agents. App
> distribution platforms shall promote the proactive declaration by app
> developers, by electronic signature, of whether they consent to invocation
> by agents; without a declared consent, an agent shall not forcibly invoke
> or call up the app. App distribution platforms shall publicly display the
> agent adaptation verification list to users on the distribution page, and
> shall not provide users with download and installation services for agents
> that are incompatible with their device model. App distribution platforms
> shall strengthen patrol inspection of the adaptation verification status
> of listed agents, and shall take measures such as rectification within a
> time limit and removal from the platform against agents that have not
> completed adaptation verification.

On the wording of the provision, a phone agent app that is distributed
independently may also be caught by these requirements. One cannot say that
item (4) has nothing to do with it merely because it is not pre-installed
software.

That said, most phone agents today are more like a "remote control". The
user gives an instruction on the phone, and the task is actually handed to a
virtual machine in the cloud or to the user's PC. Because of
operating-system restrictions, they can hardly read WeChat, Taobao and other
apps on the phone directly and then simulate the user's taps. In theory,
then, the Notice has little effect on agent apps of this kind. There are
technical exceptions, of course: once the user turns on accessibility
services and similar permissions, an Android app may be able to read the
interface and carry out a certain amount of cross-app operation.

So the form most affected by this Notice is still the one represented by the
Doubao phone: an agent pre-installed on the terminal that can use system
permissions to operate other apps directly. For WorkBuddy-type apps, the
cross-app operation actually runs on the PC, and the effect on them is
limited too.

The more interesting case is the cooperation between Apple and Qwen (千问).
In the first batch of Apple Intelligence features that Apple has announced
for China, Qwen is connected to Siri, Writing Tools and Visual Intelligence
in specific scenarios, to help answer questions, understand text and images,
or generate content. This update does not include Apple's next-generation
Siri AI features.

The China features made public so far appear to be specific capabilities
inside the system: question answering, rewriting, image understanding and
photo processing. Qwen cannot yet read the interface across apps on its own
or operate other apps in sequence. So Qwen's entry into Apple Intelligence
cannot simply be equated with the Doubao phone's capability, a system-level
GUI agent invoking apps.

If Qwen is later integrated further into Siri AI, and can invoke other apps
on its own and complete cross-app tasks on the user's instruction, it will
very probably be an agent within the meaning of the Notice, and the
invocation may fall under the adaptation and declaration mechanism in item
(4). It will then be very interesting to see whether the major apps dare to
refuse access by Apple's Siri AI.

## II. Why I support Doubao's experiment

When Doubao launched its SAEP protocol, it gave third-party apps a 30-day
public notice period. After the period ended, apps that had not expressly
refused would be opened up step by step, by risk tier. This was an attempt
at opt-out: developers may choose to leave, and if you do not leave you are
taken to have agreed. Many people questioned it: is this not implied
consent?

In my heart, though, I supported their experiment. See my earlier piece,
*When an AI Phone Operates Apps for You, Who Decides?*
(AI手机替你操作App，谁说了算？).

At least before the Notice was issued, I had not seen a general rule
requiring any agent that operates any app on a user's behalf to obtain the
target app's express consent first.

I prefer to understand Doubao's attempt as a boundary-declaration mechanism
similar to the Robots protocol: publish the rules first, let developers
express refusal and draw limits, and then explore the service within those
boundaries.

It is also easy to understand commercially. Negotiating cooperation one
company at a time means talking business terms, dividing liability and
signing contracts, and after all that time the deal may still not be done.
Put forward a set of rules first, keep a channel for refusal open, try to
get the product working, and act first.

My support has a selfish side as well. I do not want to buy an AI phone one
day and find that this app cannot be touched and that function cannot be
used.

But reality is hard. On the refusal list published when the notice period
ended in October, there were already a great many commonly used apps:
WeChat, Taobao, Alipay, Meituan, Xiaohongshu, Kuaishou and others.

The traffic logic behind it is not hard to understand either. If users hand
their needs to an agent and no longer browse recommendations, pick products
and compare services themselves, the attention and ad impressions that used
to stay inside the app may shrink. Going further, the agent may also come to
hold the power of "whom to recommend to the user", and become a new traffic
entry point. That touches the platforms' existing commercial interests.

What really worries me is what follows. If the most commonly used apps all
refuse to open up, each for its own interests, how many cross-app tasks can
an AI phone still complete for its user?

## III. History is strikingly similar

This reminds me of the dual authorization principle in *Weibo v. Maimai*.
In case (2016)京73民终588号, the Beijing Intellectual Property Court
stressed that a third party obtaining and using user information through an
open platform cannot bypass user authorization and platform authorization.
Maimai's conduct was found to constitute unfair competition; the court
upheld the first-instance judgment, ordering it to cease the conduct and to
pay RMB 2 million in economic loss plus reasonable expenses. Beyond user
authorization, platform authorization was treated as a separate requirement.

Of course, "dual authorization" did not become the only line of adjudication
in the field of data circulation. The Supreme People's Court later released
Guiding Case No. 263 on data rights and interests, (2019)沪73民终263号,
which makes clear:

> Where a network platform provides users with a linked-account service and,
> upon the user's authorization, transfers data the user has obtained on the
> linked network platform, thereby making it convenient for the user to
> process that data within a reasonable scope, and does not disrupt the
> order of market competition, the conduct does not constitute unfair
> competition.
>
> — Supreme People's Court, first thematic batch of guiding cases on the
> judicial protection of data rights and interests

If platform consent becomes a general precondition for data to flow, the
platform may hold a de facto veto. Between that and the aims of promoting
the circulation of data as a factor of production and realizing the value of
data, there is a conflict that deserves to be taken seriously.

Now that we have arrived at agents, the familiar question appears again. A
user wants to use a new tool to do something the user could have done
anyway. Should an app be able to decide, with nothing more than "I do not
consent", that it cannot happen?

## IV. What if the agent is the user's tool?

The US case *Amazon v. Perplexity* gave me a very suggestive angle.

The dispute concerns the assistant in Perplexity's Comet browser. On the
technical architecture the court examined, the user gives an instruction on
the user's own computer; the assistant reads the page information in the
browser; Perplexity's servers take part in the analysis and return operating
instructions; and in the end it is the browser on the user's computer that
accesses Amazon. One of the points in dispute was whether that access should
be attributed to the user, or to Perplexity as the provider of the
assistant.

On August 4, 2026, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the
earlier preliminary injunction. On the claims under the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act and others, the court held that the one accessing Amazon's
computers was the user, completing the operation with the help of the
assistant, and that Perplexity could not be found to have itself carried out
the access the statute refers to merely because it received screenshots and
supplied instructions. The ruling was confined to the statutory question of
"access" on the facts at that time, and the court expressly left room for
Amazon to manage access through its terms of service with users.

I like the question it put very much: who exactly is using this tool?

If the user can already access their own account, view the page and complete
an operation, and merely chooses to let an agent do it for them, why can
this not be understood as the user using a tool to carry out the user's own
intention?

Coming back to phone agents, I think the same question is worth asking. The
technical architecture of the Doubao phone differs from that of Computer
Use, and the permission chain differs, but these differences are not enough
to rule out the "user's tool" reading automatically.

That an app can more easily express and enforce a refusal at the system
layer shows that it can more easily control whether the operation takes
place. Whether it ought to have such broad control still needs a separate
justification.

As I see it, drawing the scope of authorization, operation and liability
concretely may preserve more of the value of this technology than first
letting each app decide whether to allow the agent in. See my earlier piece,
*AI Phones, Different Roads to the Same End: The Compliance Puzzle of Doubao
and Gemini* (AI手机的殊途与同归：豆包与Gemini的合规迷思).

## V. My prediction

How much this Notice will finally affect the industry is still hard to say.
For the leading apps that long ago refused in express terms, the new rule
changes nothing. The more direct change may come for the apps that have not
yet taken a position: the room there once was to try opening up after a
public notice period has been squeezed out by a clearer requirement of
declared consent.

I am still a little let down. The AI phone I was hoping for is a tool that
can get things done for me across apps. I do not want to need Tencent's
agent to reach WeChat and Alibaba's agent to reach Taobao.

Here is my irresponsible prediction: if practice shows that general refusal
by the platforms makes it hard for a phone-agent ecosystem to form, the
rules and the ways of cooperating may yet go on being adjusted.

That Taobao was later able to connect to WeChat Pay lets me keep a little
hope. The boundaries between platforms, however solid they look, are not
unchangeable forever.

This does not mean agents will necessarily take the same road. But at the
least, a door that is closed today will not necessarily stay closed.

---

## DCC's reading

*The notes below are DCC's, not the author's.*

- **The author's scope argument is textual, and it holds on the text.**
  Items (2) and (3) of the Notice are addressed to terminals with a
  pre-installed agent and their manufacturers. Item (4) is addressed to app
  distribution platforms and speaks of "agents" at large. Counsel for a
  standalone agent app should not assume the invocation rule stops at
  pre-installed products.
- **"Dual authorization" is the commentator's label.** The Notice does not
  use the phrase, and MIIT's own interpretation presents the invocation rule
  as user protection. See
  [MIIT's four-question interpretation](/posts/miit-agent-terminal-notice-official-interpretation-four-questions/).
- **The two Chinese authorities cited are unfair-competition rulings, not
  agent rulings.** *Weibo v. Maimai* and Guiding Case No. 263 were decided
  under the Anti-Unfair Competition Law on data taken from, or moved between,
  platforms. Neither concerned an agent operating an app's interface. DCC's
  translation of Guiding Case No. 263 is in
  [SPC Guiding Cases 262–267](/laws/spc-data-rights-guiding-cases-47th-batch/).
- **For the fuller account of the SAEP refusals,** including the count of
  155 apps and the structure of the protocol, see Li Wenlong's essay,
  [The Agent Authorization Standoff After SAEP](/posts/agent-authorization-standoff-saep-interoperability-rules/).

— *数据何规, 中国手机Agent进入“双重授权”时代？ (Has China's Phone Agent
Entered the Era of "Dual Authorization"?), November 6, 2026. Full
translation by DCC.
[Original (Chinese).](https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/1RKgZAoy6n0e-Hfk9ot6UQ)*

*Product descriptions, the refusal list and the account of Amazon v.
Perplexity are as stated by the original author; DCC has not independently
verified them.*

— Not legal advice.
