Filed under data-property-rights
Every brief tagged "data-property-rights".
- § 01 · DATA-PROPERTY-RIGHTS
China's Data Property Rights Registration Guide Is Final: The Draft-to-Trial Diff
On 1 July 2026, the National Data Administration issued the Data Property Rights Registration Work Guide (Trial), converting its April 2026 consultation draft into China's first national framework for registering the Right to Hold Data, Right to Use Data and Right to Operate Data. The final text keeps the same six-chapter, 42-article structure, but the diff is not cosmetic: security and public-interest gates are stronger; derived data is now defined; the national infrastructure shifts from a service platform to a service system; registrars face tighter qualification, disclosure, annual-evaluation, change-reporting and exit rules; public-data registration is softened from mandatory to conditional/voluntary wording; unclear contractual entitlement receives a cure path; evidence preservation, not certificate issuance, now starts the validity period; and certificate use is sharpened for data-asset balance-sheet entry, financing guarantees and valuation-based equity contribution.
- § 02 · DATA-ECONOMY
Li Yang: Why 'Data Rights-Confirmation' Is a Category Error — Dynamic Data Can't Be a Registration Object, and AUCL Article 13 Is the Better Path
DCC's summary of an opinion piece by Li Yang (李扬), professor at China University of Political Science and Law, arguing that the whole project of 'data rights-confirmation' (数据确权) — and the data-IP registration pilots run under it — rests on a category error. In Chinese IP law, 'confirmation' (确权) is the authoritative validation of an already-existing right, and it presupposes three things data lacks: a determinate object, defined rights content, and clear boundaries. Civil Code Art. 127 only defers the question; 'data IP' is a policy concept, not a legal one; and data is co-produced by many parties, so registration proves who submitted data, not who owns it. Li Yang's sharpest move is the dynamic-object problem: registration regimes (real estate, IP, equity) require a persistently stable object, but data's value lives in continuous updating, so the data at registration is never the data in dispute — and blockchain/hash/timestamp '存证' only fix a historical snapshot, never the living data stream, confusing proof-of-existence with object-identification. He concludes that registration's real functions are evidentiary and publicity/transaction-support — not rights-confirmation — and that data governance should move from rights-confirmation to interest-protection, from static-rights thinking to dynamic-competition thinking, protecting commercial-data interests under Article 13 of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law. DCC's read for overseas counsel, against the data-IP registration regime and the Beijing Internet Court's first AUCL Article 13 ruling.
- § 03 · ANTI-UNFAIR-COMPETITION
How the Beijing Internet Court Found a Platform 'Lawfully Held' Its Data Under the New AUCL Article 13 — and Where It Meets the 'Right to Hold Data'
The Beijing Internet Court's 30 April 2026 judgment — the first published application of the data clause (Article 13) of the 2025-revised Anti-Unfair Competition Law, effective 15 October 2025 — turns on one threshold question: did the plaintiff platform 'lawfully hold' (合法持有) the scraped career data? DCC walks through exactly how the court got to 'yes', step by step: the data originated as personal information collected with user consent under the platform's Service Agreement and Privacy Policy (no unlawful processing on record); the operator's build-and-run investment aggregated scattered records into a dataset with standalone economic value; and that dataset is the foundational input for the platform's matching business and competitive advantage. From those three findings the court derives its operative definition — data lawfully collected/stored/used, formed through substantial investment, and capable of generating business benefit or competitive advantage — and holds that the defendant's crawler-and-resale scheme, circumventing login and access controls, was unfair competition (¥200,000 + ¥30,000-plus in costs). The brief then takes up the doctrinal question: does Article 13's 'lawfully held data' correspond to the 'right to hold data' (数据持有权) in the Data 20 Articles' three-rights framework? The answer is a functional yes — the court is enforcing the holding right's purely defensive content, exactly as Hong Yanqing's analysis predicted AUCL Article 13 would — but not a doctrinal one: it builds a competition-tort interest on investment and lawful sourcing, deliberately sidestepping any claim that data is a typed property right. DCC's case brief for overseas counsel, drawn against the earlier AUCL Article 2 general-clause data cases.
- § 04 · DATA-PROPERTY-RIGHTS
Data 'Parallel Property Rights' — They Can Confer Status, but Can't Secure Control
Part four — and the synthesis — of Hong Yanqing's (洪延青, 网安寻路人) study notes on China's 'separation of three rights' data-property framework takes up 'parallel property rights' (数据平行财产权): how to allocate rights when the *same* data is held, used, and operated by *multiple* parties at once. Building on Xiong Bingwan and Zhuang Hongshan's 'one-data, multiple-rights' (一数数权) idea — data is non-rivalrous and copyable, so the same right over the same data can sit with several parties without excluding each other — Hong argues parallel property rights are best understood as *default rules* for incomplete-contract, collaborative-production settings: internally, parallel use is presumed; externally, operation is classified by data type (by-products each party may operate alone; purpose-built or fused data needs the others' consent); and parallel holders share a *joint defensive* interest against third parties. But the substance, he shows, falls back on derivative data — and here Xiong, Xu Ke (许可), and Shen Weixing (申卫星), despite different scenarios and tests, all tilt the derivative-data right to the *processor*, leaving the data contributor with contract/compensation/tort/PI remedies rather than ownership of the new product. DCC's read for overseas counsel: parallel property rights cut *attribution* uncertainty (who may use, operate, defend) but not *control* uncertainty (future use, detection, tracing, modelled value, third-party chains, ongoing compliance) — status, not control.
- § 05 · DATA-PROPERTY-RIGHTS
Why Upstream Won't Operate Its Data — Control Degradation, Derivative Data, and Irreducible Uncertainty
Part three of Hong Yanqing's (洪延青, 网安寻路人) study notes on China's 'separation of three rights' framework turns to the Right to Operate Data (数据经营权) — the right to provide data externally by transfer, licence, capital contribution, or pledge — and asks a question prior to 'what does operation transfer?': in real conditions, *will* an upstream party operate its data at all? His answer: yes, but narrowly. Control-dependent upstreams (platforms, holders of core user or irreplaceable industrial/training data) tend not to provide open, raw, autonomous access, and shift to controlled use or simply decline. The reason is structural. Once a downstream party is licensed to use data, the derivative data it produces is a *new object*: the upstream's *erga omnes* (对世) control over the raw data does not reach it, leaving the upstream — at most — a contractual claim against one counterparty. Hong then catalogues the uncertainties an upstream faces *ex ante*: some that attribution rules could touch but can't eliminate (qualification of the output, default ownership, good-faith of the processor, measurement of remedy), and some no rule can reach (combinatorial/unforeseeable value, undetectable misuse, the privity-and-insolvency chain, fusion and co-ownership, abstraction leakage into model parameters and learned skills, personal-information exposure, and counterparty hold-up). DCC's read for overseas counsel: this is the rigorous explanation of why Chinese data 'supply' is thin and why sandbox / privacy-computing structures dominate — defining a right does not supply the conditions to exercise it.
- § 06 · DATA-PROPERTY-RIGHTS
When the 'Right to Use Data' Goes External — Provision, Derivative Data, and the Erosion of Upstream Control
Part two of Hong Yanqing's (洪延青, 网安寻路人) study notes on China's 'separation of three rights' data-property framework turns to the Right to Use Data (数据使用权). The official definition (国家数据局, Common Data Terms Batch 2) makes the use right an *internal* power — 'I use my own data' to process, aggregate, analyse, and form derivative data — exercised on the premise of *not* providing data externally. So 'granting a use right to a downstream party' is not the use right travelling outward; it is the upstream party exercising its **operation right** to license, while the downstream party acquires a use right. That externalisation flips the downstream's legal position from PIPL **entrusted processor** (委托处理) to **provision** (提供) or **joint processing** — triggering notice and *separate consent* for personal information, and the Network Data Security Regulation's contracting duties. And because a strong use right lets the downstream form **derivative data** (衍生数据) — models, scores, indices, labels — value migrates downstream even though the raw data stays upstream. DCC's read for overseas counsel: in China data deals the use right is real but never self-bounding; whether a partner will grant an open, autonomous use right depends on its business model (control-dependent vs monetisation), and the default structure you should expect is *controlled use* (sandbox, privacy computing, federated modelling), not a clean copy.